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Avoiding the Pitfalls of Reform
As expected, the democratic forces won the December elections. And even though another extrem-
ist party entered parliament due to the low turnout, the DOS victory must not be "looked in the mouth."
To win 65% of the votes and 70% of the seats in parliament is a clear mandate to carry out changes, but
also an enormous responsibility for those taking over the levers of power.
At the time of this textÕs writing, the future Serbian governmentÕs personnel are known and have
already begun to function informally. Regulatory changes are in preparation, teams are assembling, and
projects are proceeding. A reform orientation is visible within the new establishment in practically all seg-
ments of the state apparatus, in the media, and more importantly, in the society. However, even the first
few months of this year will show us whether or not we are heading towards essential reforms of our
economy and manner of ruling.
The starting position is objectively difficult, but, nevertheless, we have the needed conditions for the
successful implementation of necessary reforms. However, numerous challenges lie ahead. If we yield to
them and head towards pitfalls, we could very soon be switched from the "Polish/Hungarian" to the
"Romanian/Ukrainian" tracks where pro-reform rhetoric can be heard, but where things move slowly, and
the essence of the system is not changing. In such circumstances it is important to define well which
reforms are of the greatest importance and which traps must be avoided at any cost. We can, thus, trans-
form the already proverbial "we are watching you" into its operative expression "we are measuring your
accomplishments." Business people know well that "what is measured, is done."
Suspension of Everyday Politics 
The federal deputy prime minister recently said we had already spent half of the valuable time for
reforms, three of six months of a "suspension of everyday politics" which occurs at the moment of polit-
ical transition and never again. This unrepeatable period in time was experienced and then described by
a leading protagonist of the Polish transition Leäek Balcerovi.  During this moment, society is ready for
essential changes, interest groups have still not regrouped and there is political space for acting in the
FRY a) 1999 1999 XI 2000 XI 2000 XI 2000 I-XI 2000
Basic Economic Indicators 1998 X 2000 XI 1999 I-XI 1999
Industrial Production É -24.1% É 7.6% -4.2% 13.2%
Montenegro É -7.6% É 2.5% 26.6% 5.9%
Serbia É -25.6% É 7.9% -6.0% 13.7%
Central Serbia É -24.5% É 8.4% -6.8% 15.1%
Vojvodina É -28.2% É 7.0% -4.3% 10.4%
Average Wage - DM 107 -31.7% É É É É
Montenegro 154 -14.1% É É É É
Serbia 102 -33.8% 110 12.4% 20.6% -16.1%
Unemployment Rate b) 27.3% 8.3% 28.7% É É É
Montenegro 36.8% 7.9% 39.8% É É É
Serbia 26.5% 8.2% 27.8% É É É
Export - USD million 1,498 -46.9% 131 -4.2% -8.0% 13.6%
Montenegro 123 -4.7% 7 1.1% -49.2% 23.8%
Serbia 1,375 -48.9% 124 2.1% -3.7% 12.2%
Import - USD million 3,296 -30.3% 252 2.1% -11.6% 11.1%
Montenegro 358 6.9% 17 28.5% -45.9% -13.4%
Serbia 2,938 -33.2% 233 17.9% -7.1% 14.0%
Monetary supply (M1), end of period, DIN billion 16.4 51.9% 26.7 11.5% 67.7% 58.6%
Cash 6.7 34.0% 9.1 11.6% 45.9% 38.2%
Deposits 9.7 67.2% 17.6 11.4% 81.8% 72.4%
Real money supply, end of period, DM million 739 -42.3% 889c) 16.3% 8.3% -30.5%
Market exchange rate, monthly level 4.25% -38.8% 6.88% 1.9% 55.0% 34.2%
Retail prices É 42.4% É 16.9% 109.6% 71.2%
Montenegro É 60.1% É ... ... ...
Serbia É 41.1% É 19.0% 104.9% 65.1%
Cost of living É 44.9% É 11.6% 115.3% 81.8%
Montenegro É 67.2% É ... ... ...
Serbia É 43.5% É 13.0% 111.1% 75.3%
Industrial prices É 44.2% É 22.0% 133.5% 102.1%
Montenegro É 63.7% É É É É
Serbia É 43.2% É 23.7% 130.4% 97.7%
Black market exchange rate (din/DM) 12.6 88.1% 30.00 0.0% 73.4% 111.6%
a) GDP for 1999 was 14,224 million USD, GDP per capita was 1,699 USD, GDP annual growth rate in 1999 was -19.3%, GDP annual growth per capita in 1999 was -19.1% (G17
estimate based on official data of the Federal Statistics Bureau).
b)  Unemployment rate refers to October.
C)  Real money mass is calculated by dividing nominal money mass with the black market rate.
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general interest of society. Afterwards things normalize and reforms, like in normal times and in normal
societies, are hindered and mitigated in accordance with organized interests.
True, the complexity of our political transition is not very helpful. In order for our transitional moment
to come about it took two elections, a forced out federal coalition and an unsound transitional republi-
can government in which, for example, those who had obstructed privatization for years are suddenly
speeding it up in an effort to ensure their future economic and political influence. Of course, the power
cuts and the events in southern Serbia do not ease things.
However, "the suspension of everyday politics" remains. It will not last as long as the Democratic
Opposition of Serbia (DOS) does, but the victory of precisely such a broad coalition offers space for act-
ing in favor of the general interest. It is up to the protagonists of economic policy to take as best advan-
tage of this as possible in the interest of the citizens.
Nevertheless, in view of the mentioned limitations, the results of the first three months are good.
Monetary stability, the introduction of convertibility, lowered inflation, speedy inclusion into the interna-
tional community and financial institutions, the mobilization of the first wave of donations, foreign trade
deregulation, and even a somewhat better realization of the budget in December — are all concrete accom-
plishments. The public does recognize them as the first important steps, but there are also reservations
since it is clear that these accomplishments will not persist unless five pitfalls of our reform are avoided.
Avoiding Five Pitfalls of the Reform
Everything about a radical economic reform is complex and difficult, but in our case five pitfalls could
lead to the speedy waning of the "suspension of everyday politics":
1. Setting plants into motion instead of improving the economyÕs competitiveness. In the understandable
desire to justify the votersÕ confidence with quick results, one can very often hear ideas about the
revival of the economy with no heed paid to budgetary and other economic effects. Numerous seem-
ingly modern proposals for financing by means of primary emission or through favorable credits are
proposed in various branches without adequate projections of the profitability and sustainability of the
described undertakings. A large investment cycle, and doing jobs "with the use of muscles" are obvi-
ously still present in the minds of many and we should still beware of them. For these reasons, suc-
cess should be measured by the number or scope of business plans that are at least partially support-
ed by institutions such as the European Development Bank or consortiums of domestic and foreign
banks. Furthermore, it is necessary to measure the difference in productivity between our companies
and their direct competition, search for concrete plans to bridge this gap and stipulate any financing
by progress in this respect, of course, with accompanying social measures. 
2. Maintaining links between the state, banks, and large companies instead of a division of roles and the
encouragement of sound competition. During the thirteen years of the former regimeÕs rule, terms like
"banker" or "businessman" were distorted to such an extent that many automatically link all those
involved in such affairs with irregular activities. And there is no doubt that this layer of powerful entre-
preneurs and bankers will be of great importance to us. However, it will be even more important not
to have the conclusion of business deals be the subject of direct and non-transparent negotiations under
the stateÕs auspices. It would thus be important to measure success by bringing as many spheres as
possible to open competition, by the successful completion of state tenders for privatization, as well as
obliging that the sale of securities be conducted on the open market, without an unjustified right of
preemption. 
3. Division between "federal and republican Serbs" instead of an effective re-regulation of the state. Formal
divisions of competencies between the federation and republics in the economic sphere obviously no
longer correspond to the actual state of affairs, which leads to a waste of energy and disputes. It also
complicates our international presentation. For this reason, it is necessary to measure the success of
talks on re-regulating the state by the simplification of these relations and the creation of conditions for
the rationalization of the state apparatus.
4.Tolerating "low intensity" corruption and tax evasion instead of perseverance and a principled attitude to
these issues. One of the governmentÕs priorities is to check large-scale crime and corruption. However,
there is the risk that, by "acknowledging our nature and tradition" and calculating the costs of the fight
against corruption and tax evasion in accordance with their scope, minor forms of these phenomena
will be tolerated. Nevertheless, they are no less detrimental in the long run. The measure of success
should be whether everything is done by the law in everyday life, between doctors and patients, judges
and citizens, citizens and tax regulations, and between citizens and the public revenue administration.
If not checked consistently and in its entirety corruption may reappear and acquire larger proportions.
5.Inconsistent presentation to international financial institutions instead of partnership based on clear inter-
est. It is obvious that the international community can either hinder or facilitate the realization of
reforms. The heritage of the past thirteen years of the former regime is so difficult, with the interna-
tional community having made it even more difficult through sanctions and bombardment, that we will
need support over the next two or three years. Far from the inhumane setting of conditions on the one
hand, and the humiliation of begging on the other, the international community and we possess ele-
ments of partnership based on clear interest. Investing in a stable and democratic Serbia and Yugoslavia
is a deal that could produce very positive results for both sides. The measure of success in this sphere
must be a high degree of a consensus in the country, and a professional and unified presentation mea-
sured by its effectiveness in attracting funds (donations, credits, debt rescheduling) compared to coun-
tries in our environment or which are in a similar position.
No matter how great the obstacles, reform has never had better prospects than today. Adequate mea-
sures by the authorities can considerably contribute to this dynamics and maintain as long as possible
"the suspension of everyday politics." It is up to the citizens and the civil society to assist in the further
avoidance of pitfalls threatening the reform, through a well-set and carefully monitored standard of
accomplishment.
A brief window of
opportunity
Only transparency
can return public
confidence to the
financial sector
Measure reforms &
hold the 
government
accountable
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International 
isolation and
domestic neglect
Science in Serbia:
European Reintegration is Critical
At the beginning of the 1990s, it seemed that the funding of scientific research in the
country would see a considerable rise. Furthermore, quite sound criteria for evaluating sci-
entific research were established. Publications were divided into categories by their signif-
icance and the standing of the journals (according to a so-called impact factor) they had
been published in. All indications suggested that, despite the neglect of laboratories at insti-
tutes and universities, investments in science and science itself would take the right road. 
This funding stood at approximately 1% of gross national income which was, for
instance, more than Croatia allocates today (0.5%). In Europe, the funding of science
accounts for 1.8% of gross national income, in the US its share is 2.7% and in Japan 3.1%
of gross national income. However, with the imposition of sanctions, the funding intend-
ed for scientific research plunged. The value of the per diems that could be obtained from
both the federal and republican ministries of science every other year for traveling to a
scientific gathering fell dramatically. Per diems were reduced from four to three, and their
disbursement was made according to the official exchange rate (1DM=6din), while the
real exchange rate was much higher (1DM=24din). With such daily allowances a Serbian
scientist with an opening lecture at some international congress in America or Austria was
not able even to reach Budapest.
The sharp decline in care for science followed the election of Ministers and their assis-
tants who were party yes-men. As a rule these people found it difficult even to complete
their regular studies in 10 years time with an average grade of 7. So, we witness a classic
revenge of bad students. If to this we add the dictatorship imposed at the University, the
separation of scientific institutes from the University under so-called Æeäelj’s, Markovi’s
and Boji’s Law on the University, and the fact that many academicians obediently fol-
lowed the ministerÕs "scientific guidelines," one should be glad that anyone in Serbia still
thinks about science at all.
The "brain drain" problem is characteristic of all countries of south eastern Europe, but
its proportions are drastic in this country. It is estimated that around 300,000 young and
educated people left the country over the past ten years. Most of them are now doing sci-
entific research in the West. The official figure of the outgoing Ministry is that Serbia has
15,000 scientists (see article: Richard Stone, "Help Needed to Rebuild Science in
Yugoslavia" Science, Vol. 29, London, 2000). However, the realistic figure stands at around
7,500. Namely, there existed three types of projects:
1. five-year Basic Research projects fully financed by the state; 
2.Technological projects (lasting 3 years) 70% of which was funded by the state and
30% by the industry; and 
3. Innovative projects, lasting one year, financed 50% by the state and 50% by the econ-
omy.
A scientist with a high SCI (Science Citation Index) and with articles published in for-
eign journals earned at one time 20DM per month. As a rule, the same names would
appear on both the Basic and Technological or Innovative projects for a total period of 4
months. Therefore, it is realistic to estimate that the number of scientists in Serbia is half
the official figure.
View into the Future — Joining European Scientific Projects
Owing primarily to the changes effected at the elections of September 24 and
December 23, 2000, we will be able to apply, perhaps even this year, for participation in
European projects. A workshop for the preparation of the EUÕs FP6 was held in Vienna
on December 12 and 13, 2000.  The meeting was devoted to countries of South Eastern
Europe: Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and Albania. Yugoslavia was invited as
an observer.
Representing the EU, and in charge of international scientific cooperation, were:
Rudolf Meijer and Peter Hartwich, of Austria, Dr Raoul Kneucker, director general of the
Federal Ministry of Science, and Manfred Horvat, director of the Bureau for International
Scientific and Technological Cooperation and Dr. Erhard Busek, coordinator of SECI
(South Eastern Europe Co-operation Initiative). Ten years ago, Europe began investing in
the development of science in Balkan countries. Slovenia (which can serve as a good
example for us) has made the greatest progress, but Bulgaria and Romania are not lag-
ging far behind. Major progress has been achieved by Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Macedonia and even Albania. The level of progress is best seen on the example of
Slovenia, which is presented in the following diagram.
The EU shows an
early interest in
cooperation
Slovenia ranks among medium developed countries according to the number of par-
ticipants in EU projects per 100,000 inhabitants (around 20). This comes as no surprise
since this country has long since had in Brussels its bureau for science and economic
cooperation with Europe. As the graph shows — Turkey ranks last. Of course, Yugoslavia
is not included in the above graph. However, Slovenia too needed a few years to reach
the present level. This will be the case with our country as well. The following graph best
shows this:
The number of projects in Slovenia has constantly been on the rise since 1994. The
following diagram shows SloveniaÕs total number of multilateral projects by certain scien-
tific projects: TEMPUS, COST, PECO, COPERNICUS, FP4, EUREKA, NATO, FP5.
Finally, a highly indicative figure is success at tenders.  As the following diagram
shows SloveniaÕs rate of success is about 20%.  Tenders are public. Organizations and indi-
viduals send in their proposals, while projects are considered on the basis of the rigorous
critique of a number of anonymous reviewers.
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Years are needed to
reach the desired
levels
Number of Participants in EU Scientific Projects per 100,000 Inhabitants
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The government
must foster 
integration with EU
scientific projects
Therefore, it is very important that we learn how to write and prepare proposals for
EU tenders, so that good ideas do not fall through due to a lack of knowledge of the
language of scientific grant proposals.
What is EuropeÕs interest in soliciting tenders from Balkan countries? It is primarily
the fact that a large portion of this money returns to scientific institutions in EU mem-
ber countries and their researchers. The second reason is that it does not want to see
a "brain drain" take place in Balkan countries before its very eyes. Namely, with the
departure of scientists there will be no thinking people left to push ahead the devel-
opment of the region in the economic sense, and thus of democracy as well.
The EUÕs FP6 (Framework Programme 6) will last between 2002 and 2006. There
are also specific projects such as: TEMPUS, EUREKA, COPERNIKUS, COST, etc. We
have heard about some of them, are prepared to submit proposals, but were until
recently prevented by sanctions. There is also a program for the exchange of scientists
called SOCRATES. Finally, there will probably be a tender for a program that is to be
called CARDS. The planned budget is 4.3 million euros. Tenders for this program will
be invited on March 15, 2001, and may be received until June 15, 2001. The priority
topics are: 
a) The environment and industry: regional problems. The subtopics are the treat-
ment of industrial and urban waste and the use of recycled material as well as
the development of industrial technologies benign for the environment; 
b) Health: specific regional problems. Reviewed within this topic will be post-con-
flict and post-traumatic health problems with the purpose of finding the most
effective procedures and treatments for dealing with them. 
It is up to the new Serbian Government to continue as soon as possible the initiat-
ed contacts at this working meeting. This will, unfortunately, not be an easy task. Our
scientists have had practically no contact with European science for ten years now.
Regardless of how our countryÕs economy will develop and how large our own invest-
ments in science will be, the right and only road should be our scientistsÕ inclusion in
EU scientific projects.
Priorities
Based on all that has been said, the priorities are as follows:
¥ The new Government must see to it that Yugoslavia establishes relations with all
institutions in Europe, so as to be able to join scientific institutions as well.
Following the establishment of relations with Slovenia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, it
is necessary to conclude agreements on scientific cooperation with these countries.
Europe expects us to do the same with Croatia as well.
¥ To endeavor by all means to submit superior proposals for the tenders that will be
opened in March, if not officially, then together with the delegation of Slovenia, or
Macedonia.
¥ To offer our five-year plan of scientific and technological development to the
European Commission for verification. We would thus demonstrate good will for
mutual cooperation, i.e. for integrating with the European Union in the sphere of
science as soon as possible.
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We lack not ideas,
but the modern 
language of grant
proposals
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MACROECONOMIC REVIEW
Prices and Wages
According to official statistics, the annual inflation rate measured by retail prices was 114.8%, while
the cost of living index in December 2000 year-on-year, stands at 220.4%. The prices of industrial prod-
ucts registered the highest growth at 22%. The expected increase in the costs of living in December is
around 4%, while the growth of retail prices is projected at 3.5%.
The breadth and pace of price liberalization will play an essential role in determining near-term infla-
tion trends. The direct effects of a liberal increase (by only one percent) of prices still under control
(municipal services, electricity, and oil derivatives) would be a minimum of 0.17%. This means that the
further sudden elimination of price disparities, bringing about a 20% increase in the prices of these prod-
ucts, would produce a 3.4% increase in inflation. Multiplier effects would follow very soon and would
bring into question, already at the very start, the governmentÕs commitment to hold inflation to ten per-
cent inflation. Indeed, radical price liberalization would realistically lead to an annual inflation of around
25%. However, it is realistic to expect that a decision on price liberalization, or at least its full imple-
mentation, will be somewhat postponed.
The net wages in November (3304 din. or 110DEM) increased by 13% in nominal terms month-on-
month, but this did not translate to major growth in real terms. The real purchasing power of wages (nom-
inal wages deflationed by the cost of living index) increased by 1.2% in November, unlike the preceding
month when the real purchasing power of wages fell by 8.5%. Due to traditionally higher payouts, the
December wages will improve this yearÕs wage average. Monthly growth is expected to range between
16 and 18.5%. With an expected monthly inflation rate of around 4%, this would increase the purchase
power of wages by around 12%, while the hard currency equivalent would amount to around 130 DEM.
Net pensions in November relative to October 2000, expressed in DEM recorded a 12% growth in
both real and nominal terms. The real purchasing power of pensions measured by the cost of living index
is up by 0.14%. A part of the international donations have been used for these purposes as well.
Pensioners with monthly earning below 1299 dinars have received non-recurring assistance from the
Swiss government worth 1025 dinars.
Output 
Industrial production in the FRY this November was up by 7.6% relative to the preceding month.
Production in Montenegro increased by 2.5%, and in Serbia by 7.9%. Production growth in Central Serbia
was up by 8.4% and in Vojvodina up by 7.0%. Twenty-two sectors have registered growth — between 0.3%
(the manufacture of finished textile products) and 122.7% (iron ore extraction), while 13 sectors record-
ed a decline of between 0.4% (the manufacture of finished wood products) and 31.1% (the production
of diversified products).
The deseasoned index for November shows 9.8% growth in
industrial production relative to October. November industrial output
in the FRY went down 4.2% year-on-year when the impact of sea-
sonal factors was the same. In eleven months of 2000, industrial out-
put in the FRY was up by 13.2% relative to the same period in 1999.
Montenegro recorded 5.9% growth, while growth in Serbia was
13.7%. Industrial output in Central Serbia increased by 15.2%, and in
Vojvodina by 10.4%.
Industrial output in the FRY in November 2000 was down by
70.7% relative to November 1989, and down by 70.2% in the January-
November 2000 period compared to the same period in 1989.
The Serbian electric power industry registered a 9.5% output
growth in November relative to October 2000. According to the lat-
est figures (December 25), electric power production dropped in
December by 5.7%.
According to preliminary figures of the Federal Bureau of
Statistics, industrial output increased by 12.2% in the course of 2000
compared to the preceding year, while in the last month of 2000
industrial production remained at NovemberÕs level. Furthermore, the
drop in agricultural production is larger than the rate used in the last
issue of the bulletin obtained on the basis of the data collected until
that time. Instead of 17.7%, the drop amounted to 19.7%. The estimated GDP data from the previous issue
must be reduced, since it was presumed, on the basis of data for nine, i.e. ten months, that higher growth
rates would be achieved by the end of the year. The period of institutional void during the transition obvi-
ously produced far more serious effects.
Official statistics registered a 7% growth of GDP in relation to the material concept. As the SNA con-
cept expands, primarily due to the inclusion of non-material services, the GDP growth rate will increase.
Foreign trade
The real hard currency exchange rate registered further appreciation. After almost two years of the dinarÕs
real depreciation, the domestic currencyÕs real value stands at around 74% of its average value in the 1994-
1998 period. The lowest real value level was recorded in September when the dinar dropped to only 46% of
the mentioned average. Nevertheless, such trends still produce a negligible impact on real import-export
trends. The current imbalance on the domestic market is covered by donation-related imports.
Total imports in the January-November period amounted to USD3,321 billion, while exports totaled
to USD1,562 billion. Relative to the first eleven months of 1999, exports increased by 13.6%, and imports
were up by 11.1%. The export-import ratio for the first 11 months of 2000 was 47%.
Taking into account possible corrections, the Yugoslav economyÕs commodity trade deficit in 1999
will range around USD2 billion. Exports dropped by 4.22% in November relative to the preceding month,
which amounted to USD131 million, while imports increased by 2.09% and totaled at US$252 million. The
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export-import ratio in November was 51.8%. Serbia exported goods worth US$124 million, while its
imports amounted to USD233 million. Relative to November 1999, both exports and imports registered a
drop by 8% and 11.6%.
In November, month-on-month, electricity imports and exchange (expressed in USD) increased by
78%. This trend continues so that by December 25 the import of electricity was up by 75% on November.
If the average KWh price is 3.2 cents, then electricity imports alone (including exchange) totaled to USD50
million. Of course, this sum should be taken conditionally, since it is uncertain whether the amount will
actually be paid.  In this case too, deficits are covered by donations.
The main export partners of the FRY in November were: Bosnia-Herzegovina (with Republika Srpska)
15%, Italy 12.8%, Macedonia 12.2% and Germany 10.3%. The countries
from which it imported were: Germany 12.8%, Italy 10.5%, Russia 8.9%
and Bulgaria 8.9%. The FRY has a positive balance only with BiH and
Macedonia, while its largest trade deficit is with Germany USD269 mil-
lion and Bulgaria USD279 million.
Aluminum and raspberries had the largest share in the FRYÕs
exports. Due to the reduction of customs burdens, consumer goods are
expected to prevail among imports in the future.
Money 
The money supply (M1) at the end of November was 26.67 billion
dinars, i.e. 889 million DEM. With the inclusion of dinar quasi-money,
the M2 money aggregate was 31.93 billion dinars. The nominal money
supply (M1) relative to October was up by 11.5%, while an expansive
monetary policy continued in December as well. At the end of 1999,
the money supply exceeded the level of one billion DEM with DEM
1,042 billion.
The ratio of the money offer and demand in the Serbian econo-
my, if the dolarization problem is excluded, is relatively easy to fol-
low. A good approximation of the transactional money demand (other
motives for keeping dinars — caution or manipulative motives practi-
cally do not exist) is the trend of public revenues, since their share in the social product is exception-
ally high.
While transactional demand is a stable magnitude, divergent trends have appeared in the real
money supply expressed in German marks and that expressed in real dinars. Over the past four months,
M1 expressed in hard currency has increased by 43%, while the M1 expressed in real dinars has
dropped by 13.8%. This growth consists of two components. First, with the stabilization and official
devaluation of the exchange rate, the dinarÕs black market and giro exchange rate became insignificant,
and so was the previous manner of calculation, according to which one of the components of the M1
money aggregate — deposit money - was reduced to its real hard currency value with the use of the
dinarÕs higher giro exchange rate.  Secondly, the dinar achieved real appreciation due to high month-
ly inflation rates at the end of the year following price liberalization.
Over the past months, the National Bank of YugoslaviaÕs (NBJ) transparency has considerably
increased and a decision on the monetary policy for 2001 was also
taken. According to announcements, primary money will be released
only on the basis of an increase in hard currency reserves and oper-
ations on the open market within the permitted growth of net domes-
tic assets (which also represents the control aggregate). This aggregate
is planned to increase by 500 million dinars in the first three-month
period. As of the beginning of the new year the NBJÕs monthly gen-
eral discount rate of 2% will be applied. The NBJ projects that month-
ly price growth will fall below 1%, i.e. an annual inflation rate of
around 10%. In this case, the discount rate would be of a real posi-
tive magnitude and would begin to perform the function of an instru-
ment. Nevertheless, in 2001 the inflation rate will be decided on to a
lesser degree by the NBJ and more by the republican government at
it makes choices on the pace of chosen liberalization.
The decision to introduce a guided fluctuating exchange rate as of
January 1, 2001 can be explained by the fact that they do not believe
at the NBJ that payment balance difficulties will occur amid the expec-
tation of a larger inflow of assets into the capital account. In 2001, a
higher trade deficit is expected — due to the liberalization of imports,
the further inflow of donations and partly also because of the appear-
ance of "hidden" imports. This last element will be counterbalanced by the unstated inflow of hard cur-
rency. The second element — the introduction of a new hard currency regime, is based on the argu-
ment concerning the domestic economyÕs submonetization. A restoration of confidence in the dinar
(accompanied by an unprecedented marketing campaign) would lead to a change in the household
portfolio and the additional growth of hard currency reserves, which would again be used for inter-
vening on the interbank hard currency market.
It should be noted that the National BankÕs moves were also partly conditioned by admission to
international financial institutions.
Finally, the federal assembly has adopted the budget. It amounts to 45.87 billion dinars, i.e. USD745
million, representing a considerable reduction. Budget revenues are of the following structure — 52%
from the sales tax (including the special federal sales tax and excises); 31% from customs duties; 8.2%
from taxes and 8.8% from special and other revenues. The financing of defense is 32.13 billion dinars
or USD522 million. Apart from defense, which accounts for 69.9% of overall federal expenditures, the
remaining important items are federal employees at 15.7%, obligations towards pension funds at 7%,
and funds for interventions in the economy which account for a little over USD 30 million, or 4%.
Macroeconomic Review December 2000 7
Commodity Import and Export 
(Serbia without Kosovo)
-400
-300
-200
-100
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
Export
Import
Jan
00
Jan
99
Jan
98
Jan
97
Jan
96
Jan
95
Jan
94
Trade Deficit
bil.$
Real Money & Transaction Demand
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
Real dinar (1994) & DEM
M1 in DEM
M1 in 1994 dinars
Money Transaction Demand (Real public revenue)
Jan
00
Jan
99
Jan
98
Jan
97
Jan
96
Jan
95
Jan
94
Yugoslavia in the mirror of Eastern Europe
mil. USD
0
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
Macedonia
FRY (without Kosovo)
19991998199719961995199419931992
GDP
The Economic Review is a cooperative effort of Group 17 & The EastWest Institute ¥ Group 17, Gospodar Jevremova 33, Belgrade, (381 11) 624 669
¥ EastWest Institute, Raänovo nbÞeì 78, 120 00 Prague 2, (420 2) 2198 4222 ¥ Milko Ætimac & Aaron Presnall, editors ¥ Opinions expressed are the
authorsÕ alone and do not necessarily reflect those of G17 or EWI ¥ For information on free email or fax delivery, please visit: www.iews.cz/frytf
USD
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
Macedonia
FRY (without 
Kosovo)
19991998199719961995199419931992
GDP per capita
mil USD
’99’98’97’96’95’94’93’92’91’90
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
Macedonia
FRY
Import
mil USD
’99’98’97’96’95’94’93’92’91’90
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
Macedonia
FRY
Export
’99’98’97’96’95’94’93’92’91’90’89
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
110
120
Macedonia
FRY
Industrial Production
1989 = 100
DEM
20001999199819971996
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
Serbia
Macedonia
Salaries
Quarterly Wage
8 December 2000 Macroeconomic Review
